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Abstract: This article explores the case for legislation that focuses specifically on
cross-border consumer transactions in the internal market. It argues that the existence
of two parallel regimes (domestic and cross-border) is a positive step because the
cross-border environment gives rise to different problems than the domestic context. It
develops a notion of ‘cross-border’ that is different from that in Common European
Sales Law (CESL), before considering the arguments for and against this approach.
The positive view of a regulation focusing on cross-border transactions is combined
with the argument in that the substantive provisions of CESL would need to be
redrafted so as to fully address all the specific issues that arise in the cross-border
context. Moreover, a cross-border CESL should be automatically applicable, i.e., not
optional. It concludes that the step taken towards a cross-border regulation is a
positive one, but that further work on the substance of a CESL is needed.
Zusammenfassung: Dieser Aufsatz untersucht die Argumente für ein Instrument für
grenzüberschreitende Verbraucher-Transaktionen im Binnenmarkt. Die Existenz von
zwei Parallelregimen (für nationale bzw. grenzüberschreitende Verträge) ist ein
positive Schritt, da im grenzüberschreitenden Kontext andere Probleme als im
nationalen Kontext zu lösen sind. Dieser Aufsatz entwickelt ein Verständnis von
‘grenzüberschreitend’, der anders als die im GEK vorgesehene Definition ist, und
befasst sich dann mit den Argumenten für und gegen diesen Ansatz. Die positive
Einstellung zu einer Verordnung über grenzüberschreitende Transaktionen wird
kombiniert mit dem Argument, das die Substanz des GEK überarbeitet werden muss,
um auf die spezifischen grenzüberschreitenden Problem anwendbar zu sein. Überdies
sollte ein grenzüberschreitendes GEK automatisch und nicht optionell anzuwenden
sein. Die Schlussfolgerungen dieses Beitrages sind, dass der Schritt zu einer
grenzüberschreitenden Verordnung richtig ist, aber dass mehr Arbeit am Inhalt eines
GEKs notwendig ist.
Résumé: Cet article examine l’opportunité d’une législation concernant
spécifiquement les transactions transfrontalières du consommateur dans le marché
intérieur. Il estime que l’existence de deux régimes parallèles (interne et
transfrontalier) constitue une étape positive dans la mesure où l’environnement
transfrontalier suscite des problèmes différents de ceux relevant du contexte national.
Il développe une notion du caractère ‘transfrontalier’ qui est différente de celle du
Droit commun européen de la vente (DCEV), avant de considérer les arguments pour
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et contre de cette approche. La vision positive d’un Règlement se concentrant sur les
transactions transfrontalières est combinée avec l’argument selon lequel les
dispositions de fond du DCEV devraient être redéfinies afin de viser entièrement tous
les aspects spécifiques qui se présentent dans un contexte transfrontalier. De plus, un
DCEV transfrontalier serait automatiquement applicable, c’est-à-dire non optionnel. Il
conclut que l’étape franchie en direction d’un règlement transfrontalier est une étape
positive, mais qu’il est nécessaire de poursuivre le travail sur la substance d’un DCEV.
1. Introduction
The proposal for a Common European Sales Law (CESL)1 is widely regarded as a
milestone in the evolution of both EU Consumer and EU Contract Law.
Inevitably, it has prompted intense academic discussion.2 In this article, one
particular feature of the proposed CESL is singled out for discussion: its
limitation to cross-border transactions. This would leave Member States free to
regulate domestic transactions as they see fit, subject, of course, to the limitations
already imposed by the harmonization programme in the field of consumer law.
The proposal marked a significant shift in the approach towards adopting
legislation in the field of European (consumer) contract law in that it no longer
pursues the harmonization of aspects of domestic laws by introducing common
rules across all the Member States irrespective of the geographical dimension of
the contract but rather concentrates on transactions that have a real internal
market dimension. As originally proposed, the CESL would have applied to all
transactions with a cross-border dimension, but following the amendments
proposed by the European Parliament, it may now be limited to distance and
online cross-border transactions.3
The limitation of CESL to cross-border distance transactions was given a
mixed reception, something that is understandable if one bears in mind the long
gestation period of the proposal – in particular the rather grand vision for
European Contract Law, which was hotly debated during the first decade of this
century.4 The legislative process that resulted in the Consumer Rights Directive
(2011/83/EU) made it apparent that there was a distinct lack of appetite on the
part of the Member States for substantial full harmonization of key aspects of
consumer contract law, and so it was inevitable that an alternative had to be
found. Strangely, the alternative, which might seem counter-intuitive to some
1 COM (2011) 635 final, 11 Oct. 2011.
2 Early books on the proposal include M. SCHMIDT-KESSEL (ed.), Ein einheitliches europäisches
Kaufrecht? (Munich: Sellier, 2012); H. SCHULTE-NÖLKE, F. ZOLL, N. JANSEN & R. SCHULZE (eds),
Der Entwurf für ein optionales europäisches Kaufrecht, (Munich: Sellier, 2012).
3 See T7-0159/2014. This is something the present author has argued for elsewhere: see C.
TWIGG-FLESNER, A Cross-Border-Only Regulation for Consumer Transactions – A Fresh Approach
to EU Consumer Law (New York: Springer, 2012). This article is a further development of the
notion of ‘cross-border transaction’ found in that publication.
4 See C. TWIGG-FLESNER, The Europeanisation of Contract Law (2nd ed. Routledge, 2013).
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bearing in mind the objective of completing the internal market within the EU,5
has got a long track record in the field of international commercial law, where a
range of international conventions have been adopted which deal with various
aspects of international commercial transactions – not least the UN Convention
on the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG), widely ratified by many countries
around the world, including the majority of the EU Member States. Although the
context for the CISG is obviously a different one, it would nevertheless be
instructive to take its approach into account.
This article will argue that the change of direction with a focus on
cross-border transactions is to be welcomed and that the existence of two parallel
regimes will not inevitably be problematic. It will first explore the notion of
‘cross-border’ but offer a different approach to the one taken in CESL. There will
then be a consideration of the arguments in favour of this approach, as well as
potential obstacles. The support for a cross-border CESL advocated in this article
is twinned with an argument in favour of re-designing the substantive provisions
of CESL so as to ensure that these fully address all the specific issues that arise in
the cross-border context. It will further be argued that a cross-border CESL should
be automatically applicable, i.e., not optional. The discussion that follows focuses
exclusively on consumer contracts, and the arguments made should be understood
as applying only to these. The treatment of contracts between SMEs raises
different issues, which are not the focus of this article.
2. Defining ‘Cross-Border’
As this article argues in favour of the cross-border-only focus of CESL, the
starting point has to be a discussion of how one might define the notion of
‘cross-border’. This is essential because if it is not possible to come up with a
satisfactory definition, then that would defeat any further argument in favour of
such a focus. One of the advantages of the harmonization approach is that there is
no need to find a demarcation line between ‘domestic’ and ‘cross-border’ and the
obvious potential for uncertainty in having a grey area of transactions, which
could on various grounds be classified as either. However, if there is to be a
measure specifically applicable to cross-border transactions, then there needs to
be some sort of test for determining which contracts are domestic and which are
cross-border, respectively.
This section will analyse a number of circumstances and suggest which of
these should be treated as cross-border situations. For the purposes of this
discussion, the rules of private international law on consumer contracts in Article
5 S. WEATHERILL, ‘The Consumer Rights Directive: How and Why a Quest for Coherence Has
(largely) Failed’, 49. Common Market Law Review 2012, p (1279) 1308 ff.
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15 of the Brussels-I Regulation6 and Article 6 of the Rome-I Regulation7 are
initially left to one side but will become relevant later (see section 2.1 below).
The following are the most common situations that fall to be considered:
(1) Consumer and trader are based in the same jurisdiction, and the
contract is concluded by whichever means (face-to-face, distance,
online).
(2) Consumer and trader are based in separate jurisdictions, and the
contract is concluded at a distance (online).
(3) Consumer and trader are based in separate jurisdictions (but perhaps
in a border region), and the consumer travels into the neighbouring
country to conclude a contract face-to-face.
(4) A variant on (3), but the consumer is on holiday in another country
and concludes a contract face-to-face.
(5) Consumer and trader are based in separate jurisdictions, but the trader
visits the consumer’s jurisdiction and concludes a contract (e.g.,
door-step selling, markets, exhibitions).
With the exception of the first situation, all of these appear to have a
cross-border element. However, this does not invariably lead to the conclusion
that all of these should be treated as ‘cross-border transactions’. If so, they would
all be within the scope of a measure for cross-border transactions. However, it
needs to be considered whether it is appropriate that all of these are treated as
cross-border transactions, and in order to address this, a general test is needed.
This problem is not new, of course – the same challenge arose in the
context of transnational commercial law, e.g., with regard to the scope of
application of the CISG. In that Convention, a contract is treated as
‘international’ if the respective places of business of the parties are in different
states (Article 1(1) CISG). ‘Internationality’ is therefore established on the basis
of the location of the respective places of business of the parties, rather than the
fact that goods cross borders. Would it be enough to adopt this approach for
consumer transactions, or is something more refined required?
Obviously, consumers do not have a place of business, but the obvious
alternative criterion would be the consumer’s place of residence (i.e., his habitual
residence). Using the CISG test would therefore mean that a contract concluded
in a Member State where both the consumer has his place of residence and the
trader his place of business (situation (1)) would be a domestic transaction.
6 Regulation 44/2001/EU on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in
civil and commercial matters (2001) O.J. L 12/1.
7 Regulation 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (2008) O.J. L 177/6.
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Conversely, a contract concluded between a consumer with a place of residence in
one Member State and the trader with his place of business in another would be a
cross-border contract (situations (2)–(5) above).
This would clearly not be problematic in the case of situation 2, where the
contract is concluded through distance means, which would generally mean via
online shopping. The order is placed by a consumer with a place of residence in
one jurisdiction and received by the trader with a place of business in another
jurisdiction.
However, it seems somewhat counter-intuitive to regard situations 3–5 as
cross–border transactions, too. In all of these, the consumer has his place of
residence in one jurisdiction and the trader his place of business in another, but
trader and consumer are both physically present in one jurisdiction, which is
where the contract is concluded. Applying a test based on the CISG approach
would mean that all of these situations should be regarded as cross-border
transactions, but it may be questioned whether it would be appropriate to do so.
On the basis of applying the CISG test for establishing whether this is an
international or cross-border transaction by analogy, these situations would clearly
satisfy that test. However, it is necessary to pause and ask whether the fact that
both consumer and trader are physically present in the same jurisdiction when
and where the contract is concluded should be taken into account.
At this point, one might ask what trader and consumer would reasonably
expect to be the answer if they were to ask themselves which law applied to this
transaction. The trader might not know that that the consumer has a place of
residence in another Member State (although in some instances, e.g., in a holiday
resort, this would be fairly likely), so the question of there being a cross-border
element might not even enter his mind. This would, perhaps, depend on the
consumer’s competence in the local language or the method of payment used by
the consumer – both could offer a strong indication to the trader as to whether
the consumer is from another jurisdiction. One might therefore be tempted to
rely on all of these factors as an indication of whether something is or is not a
cross-border transaction. However, whilst such a refined analysis of each situation
might be the kind of intellectual tickle that would excite lawyers, it seems rather
impractical at the coal face of daily consumer contracting, not least because of the
degree of uncertainty it might create for trader and consumer alike. It seems
likely that the trader would expect – reasonably so – that any transaction
concluded in this type of situation would be subject to the domestic law of the
jurisdiction where this happened. Looking at the same situation from a
consumer’s perspective, it would seem quite likely that a consumer buying
something in another country would assume that the domestic law of that
jurisdiction applied. If this is correct, then it would be appropriate to treat
situations 3 and 4 as domestic rather than cross-border transactions.
Finally, in the converse situation in scenario 5, a transaction would to be
subject to the consumer’s domestic law if the trader was present in the
235
jurisdiction where the consumer has his place of residence and the transaction
was entered into there.8 So this situation should also not be regarded as a
cross-border situation.
What this suggests is that, in the context of consumer transactions, it
might be necessary to adopt a more refined approach than that offered by Article
1(1) of the CISG. The guiding criterion in developing this approach should be a
consideration of which law consumer and trader would reasonably expect to be
applicable to the transaction where it is entered into in face-to-face circumstances.
If the analysis above is correct, then the conclusion that might be reached is that
a face-to-face contract concluded in the jurisdiction of the trader’s place of
business should be subject to the law of that jurisdiction and not be treated as a
cross-border transaction.
What this leads to is the conclusion that the kinds of transactions that
should be regarded as cross-border transactions are those that are conducted
online or at a distance, with consumer and trader based in different jurisdictions.
However, whilst this conception of ‘cross-border transaction’ has a certain appeal
due to its simplicity, there is one question that requires further elaboration: the
one difficult case that would remain with this approach is the situation where the
consumer travels to the trader’s jurisdiction because the trader has directed his
activities at the consumer’s jurisdiction. The next two sections consider whether
the basic definition therefore should and could be refined.
2.1. A Difficult Case: Trader’s Actions Result in Consumer Travelling
(‘Directed Activity’)
The suggested definition of ‘cross-border’ developed above is open to the
criticism that it proceeds on the basis of clear ‘either-or’ situations. Whilst this
has the advantage of creating a bright-line rule, it does raise the question how
‘difficult’ cases should be tackled, i.e., circumstances where there are additional
features that make a particular situation more difficult to analyse.
For example, it was argued above that, in situations (3) and (4), the
contract should be treated as domestic to the jurisdiction where it was concluded,
rather than a cross-border situation. It might be suggested that a distinction
should be drawn between instances where the consumer is in another jurisdiction
and makes a spontaneous purchase (which would not be a cross-border
transaction) and where the consumer has travelled to that jurisdiction because the
trader issued some sort of specific invitation to the consumer. Although it might
seem sensible to regard the latter situation as a domestic rather than a
cross-border transaction, because the consumer will still be physically present in
8 This would be also the outcome under Art. 6(1) of the Rome-I Regulation (593/2008/EU) –
which deals with the applicable law in consumer contracts (see below) – as the trader would be
pursuing his activities in the country of the consumer’s habitual residence.
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the trader’s jurisdiction, the additional element of the trader’s actions might have
to be taken into consideration. Indeed, at that point, it might further depend on
whether the invitation was addressed personally to the consumer or whether the
directed activity is more general (i.e., a general website) – but if it is a website and
the contract is concluded online, then it would be a cross-border transaction
anyway.
But if the consumer physically travels to the trader’s jurisdiction having
seen the website, there is an argument – admittedly one based on convenient
simplicity –that this contract should be subject to the law of the trader’s
jurisdiction and consequently not a cross-border contract. From a practical
perspective, it reduces the risk of confusion: a trader dealing with two separate
consumers from another jurisdiction might not be able to identify whether one,
both or neither received a specific invitation, and so would not necessarily know
whether domestic law or the cross-border regulation would apply.9
At this point, it will be useful to examine this situation from the
perspective of identifying the applicable law under Article 6(1) of the Rome-I
Regulation, which deals with consumer contracts. Where Article 6(1) applies, the
applicable law is the law of the country where the consumer has his habitual
residence.10 There are two alternative preconditions, one of which needs to be
met for this provision to apply:
(i) the trader pursues his commercial or professional activities in the country
where the consumer has his habitual residence; or
(ii) the trader by any means directs such activities to that country or to several
countries including that country.
In addition, in either case the contract has to fall within the scope of the trader’s
commercial or professional activities. It can be assumed that an invitation by a
trader to a consumer would be regarded as a ‘directed activity’ within the
meaning of Article 6(1) and the resulting contract would therefore be subject to
the law of the consumer’s jurisdiction.
As a result, the suggestion above that this situation should not be regarded
as a cross-border situation might run into difficulties here, because if Article 6
continued to apply with a measure for cross-border contracts in place, then the
domestic law applicable would be the law of the consumer’s jurisdiction and not
the trader’s. One possible response to this is to modify the definition of
cross-border and include this particular situation.
9 The difficult evidential burden was a factor in Case C-218/12 Lokman Emrek v. Vlado
Sabranovic [2013] ECR-nyr, discussed below.
10 For a fuller analysis, see P. CACHIA, ‘Consumer Contracts in European Private International Law:
The Sphere of Operation of the Consumer Contract Rules in the Brussels I and Rome I
Regulations’, 34. European Law Review 2009, pp 476–490.
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There are a number of possible ways forward. The first would be to
abandon Article 6 once a measure for cross-border transactions has been put into
place. This would, in turn, necessitate refining the definition of ‘cross-border’ to
incorporate this situation so as to produce a similar effect to the one of Article 6,
which is to ensure consumers do not lose out on legal protection through the
application of the trader’s domestic law. The second would be to retain the
simpler definition of ‘cross-border’ and to let Article 6 operate, but this would
have the drawback for traders that they would still be faced with the application of
multiple consumer laws (depending on the number of countries to which he
directs his activities). The third would be to abandon Article 6 whilst adopting the
simpler definition of ‘cross-border’, but that would have the effect of applying the
law of the trader’s jurisdiction. At the very least, this would be seen as a
retrograde step with the potential risk of reducing consumer protection (although
this argument surely has to be set against the fact that the EU’s harmonization
programme has done enough to make this much less of a real problem). So, on
balance, the first option outlined here would be preferable.
2.2. Defining Cross-Border and Lessons from Case Law
At this juncture, it is helpful to consider whether the case law of the CJEU
developed in the field of private international might shed any additional light on
the question of how to define cross-border. It has already been noted that the
steer given by Article 6(1) of the Rome-I Regulation offers a particular steer for
some circumstances. There are a number of cases under Article 15(1) of the
Brussels-I Regulation that offer some additional pointers. According to the
provisions of the Brussels-I Regulation, in ‘matters relating to contract’,
jurisdiction is given to ‘the courts for the place of performance of the obligation
in question’ (Article 5(1)(a)). For consumer contracts (i.e., those between a
trader11 and a person acting for a purpose regarded as outside his trade or
profession), there are separate provisions that apply primarily where a contract
has been concluded with a trader pursuing his activities in the consumer’s
domicile or where the trader directs his activities to that Member State and the
contract is within the scope of these activities (Article 15(1)(c)).12 The consumer
has the choice between the courts of his domicile or those of the trader’s domicile
(Article 16(1)), but he may only be sued in his domicile (Article 16(2)).
11 I.e., a ‘person who pursues commercial or professional activities’ (Art. 15(1)(c)).
12 The other situations in Art. 15 are (a) contracts for the sale of goods on instalment credit terms
and (b) contracts for a loan repayable by instalments or any other form of credit that was made to
finance the sale of goods.
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In Pammer v. Schlüter,13 the CJEU was asked to consider when websites
would be regarded as a ‘directed activity’. As websites are generally accessible
throughout the EU and beyond, the mere accessibility of a website beyond the
country where the trader is established did not mean that the trader actually
directs his activities beyond the borders of this country.14 The trader must have
‘manifested its intention to establish commercial relations with consumers from
one or more other Member States, including that of the consumer’s domicile’.15 A
number of criteria would be relevant: the mere provision of the trader’s e-mail
address or geographical address, or of his telephone number without the
international dialling code, was irrelevant – whilst this information does enable
the consumer to contact the trader electronically, this was insufficient.16
However, a clear statement by the trader on the website that goods or services are
offered in one or more Member States, and these states are mentioned by name,
or the paid inclusion in search engines accessed from particular Member States
would be relevant evidence (paragraph 81). Additionally, more specific factors
might include ‘the international nature of the activity at issue; … telephone
numbers with the international dialling code; use of a top-level domain name
other than that of the Member State in which the trade is established … or the
use of neutral top-level domain names such as “.com” or “.eu”;...mention of an
international clientele composed of customers domiciled in various Member
States …’.17 In addition, if the website provides the option of using a language or
currency different from that of the Member State where the trader is established,
then this can be taken as evidence that the trader directs his activities to other
jurisdictions.18
This decision certainly adds some clarification to the meaning of ‘directed
activity’, and it could easily be transplanted into the context of the refined
‘cross-border’ criterion developed above. If traders directs their activity into the
consumer’s jurisdiction, this would then be treated as a cross-border situation
(but would not result in the application of the law of the consumer’s habitual
residence).
It has been considered in two subsequent cases, the facts of which illustrate
difficulties with the ‘directed activity’ criterion that would be relevant to the test
of ‘cross-border’ developed above. The first is Mühlleitner v. Ysufi.19 The Austrian
claimant accessed a German search platform to look for a car. Her search results
13 Joined Cases C-585/08 and 144/09 Peter Pammer v. Rederei Karl Schlüter GmBH & Co KG;
Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v. Oliver Heller [2010] ECR I-12527.
14 Paragraphs 68–69.
15 Paragraph 75.
16 Paragraphs 76–79.
17 Paragraph 83.
18 Paragraph 84.
19 Case C-190/11 Daniela Mühlleitner v. Ahmad Yusufi, Wadat Yusufi [2012] ECR I-xxx.
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directed her to the website of the car dealership operated by the defendants. She
contacted the defendants by telephone (the website included the telephone
number with the international dialling code!), but the car she was interested in
was no longer available. The defendants suggested another vehicle and emailed
details to her. The claimant then travelled to Hamburg to conclude the contract
and took delivery of the car. On returning to Austria, she discovered faults with
the car, which the defendants refused to repair, so she commenced legal
proceedings in the Austrian courts. The defendants argued that she should have
brought her action in the German courts because the special jurisdiction rules in
Articles 15/16 of the Brussels-I Regulation did not apply. The lower courts in
Austria treated the defendant’s website as a ‘passive’ website and therefore the
defendants had not directed their activities towards Austria. The Austrian
Supreme Court took a different view and held that the defendants did direct their
activities to Austria, but in light of Pammer v. Schlüter, it referred a question to
the CJEU as to whether it was necessary that a contract had to have been
concluded at a distance for the special jurisdiction rules to apply. On the basis of
both the legislative history to these provisions and by way of clarification of
Pammer v. Schlüter, the CJEU held that it was not necessary that the contract was
concluded at a distance and the special jurisdiction rules would apply if the
criteria in Article 15(1)(c) are satisfied. This case is interesting because it is one
example of the first ‘difficult case’ discussed above: a consumer had some contact
with the trader at a distance and then travelled to the trader’s jurisdiction to
conclude the contract. As argued above, this should be treated as a domestic
contract subject to the laws of the trader’s jurisdiction (i.e., Germany), unless the
trader was involved in a ‘directed activity’ towards Austria. Unfortunately, the
question of whether this was so on the facts of the case was not open to
consideration by the CJEU – the Austrian Supreme Court had already decided that
the trader had directed his activities to Austria. This was confirmed in its final
ruling.20 The Austrian court came to this conclusion for two reasons: (i) the
traders had included the international dialling code on their website21 and (ii)
when the claimant contacted them, they supplied information about an alternative
vehicle to her, in the knowledge that she lived in Austria. This conclusion seems
surprising – after all, the claimant had made the first step and sought out the
trader, and it seems difficult to regard the trader’s subsequent actions as
constituting a ‘directed activity’. This seems to fall short of actively seeking
customers from Austria – indeed, their response to the initial enquiry is more
20 OGH 18 Oct. 2012, 4 Ob 172/12s.
21 The weight attached to including an international dialling code as a key criterion for establishing
whether a trader is directing its activities at another Member State seems rather odd in view of
the relative significance of this as a means of communication these days.
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likely to have been focused on finding a suitable car for the claimant and
therefore was an individual response, rather than a properly directed activity.
This approach should not be followed in the context of the refined
definition of ‘cross-border’, because it would have the effect of blurring
significantly the line between cross-border and domestic transactions. The
decision whether a contract in circumstances as those in Mühlleitner should be
regarded as cross-border should not depend on particular individualized responses
by a trader to unsolicited enquiries from a consumer.
An even more difficult factual situation arose in Emrek v. Sabranovic.22 In
this case, the claimant consumer lived in Saarbrücken in Germany, and the
defendant trader, a car dealer, was based in France. However, the French town
was close to the border, and the story that follows will be very familiar to anyone
who has grown up in a border region. The defendant had a website that include
both French and German telephone numbers with their international dialling
codes. The claimant wanted to buy a second-hand car, and friends of his
mentioned the defendant’s business. He then travelled to France and concluded a
contract for a second-hand car at the defendant’s premises. The claimant had not
seen the defendant’s website. A dispute arose, and the claimant brought an action
before a German court. On appeal, the regional court concluded that the
defendant had directed his activities to Germany (the telephone numbers being an
indication that he was willing to deal with customers from Germany as well as
France), but it also thought that there needs to be a causal link between the
directed activity and the decision to conclude the contract, i.e., the special
jurisdiction provisions should not apply where the consumer was not aware of the
directed activity. The CJEU held that no such causal link could be read into
Article 15(1)(c), not least because this would undermine consumer protection.23
More significantly, there would be difficulties of proving whether a consumer had
or had not consulted the trader’s website in advance of deciding to conclude the
contract,24 and at best, the causal link argued for would be evidence to support
the conclusion that the trader had indeed directed his activities at the consumer’s
country.
This, too, is a situation where it seems preferable to take a different stance
on the meaning of ‘directed activity’ for the purpose of deciding whether a
contract is a cross-border transaction or not. Following on from the observations
made with regard to the Mühlleitner ruling, it is suggested that a criterion based
on the notion of ‘directed activity’ should require clear pro-active steps by a
trader to attract consumers from another Member State, so in a situation such as
the one in Emrek, the contract should be regarded as a domestic contract (which
22 Case C-218/12 Lokman Emrek v. Vlado Sabranovic [2013] ECR-nyr.
23 Paragraph 24.
24 Paragraph 25.
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it would not have been had the claimant concluded the contract entirely at a
distance).
These cases illustrate that there will be difficult situations where it is not
easy to determine whether a contract has crossed the line from domestic to
‘cross-border’. Whilst the decisions can be accepted in their context (i.e.,
determining jurisdiction), it must be concluded that, as far as the insertion of a
‘directed activity’ criterion into the ‘cross-border’ test is concerned, a modified
version requiring more active steps on the part of a trader is needed.
However, on a more positive note, the foregoing has demonstrated that it
is far from impossible to develop a workable and meaningful definition of
‘cross-border’, and so the initial hurdle for the overall argument in this article can
be overcome without great difficulty.
2.3. ‘Cross-Border’ in CESL
Having considered when a situation should be regarded as a ‘cross-border’
situation, it is now appropriate to consider how the discussion above relates to the
definition in the proposed CESL. The solution adopted in the initial proposal is
far from ideal. A distinction is made between contracts between traders only and
those between a trader and a consumer. For contracts where both parties are
traders, a contract will be a cross-border contract if the habitual residence of the
parties is in different countries, of which at least one has to be a Member State
(Article 4(2)). The habitual residence of a trader, which is a company, is the place
of its central administration, and if the trader is a natural person, it is that
person’s principal place of business (Article 4(4)). The determining factor is
therefore the location of the parties, rather than whether goods cross any borders.
For contracts between a consumer and a trader, the criterion is more
complex. Article 4(3) of the proposal states that:
For the purposes of this Regulation, a contract between a trader and a
consumer is a cross-border contract if
(a) either the address indicated by the consumer, the delivery address for
goods or the billing address are located in a country other than the
country of the trader’s habitual residence; and
(b) at least one of these countries is a Member State.
The first element of this definition has two reference points: (i) the trader’s
habitual residence and (ii) the consumer’s address, the delivery address or the
billing address. These must be in difference countries. As initially drafted, this
would have meant that the CESL could apply to face-to-face as well as
distance/online contracts. However, the European Parliament has amended the
opening sentence of Article 4 to make it clear that it applies only to distance and
online transactions. The second element – the fact that one of the countries has to
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be a Member State – presumably relates to the territorial extent of the regulation
and the need for a connecting factor with the EU. It does seem rather complex a
test though, not least because it is possible that a transaction would become a
cross-border transaction if the consumer specifies a delivery address in a Member
State different from that of the trader, even though both consumer and trader are
in fact based in the same jurisdiction. This approach is also quite different from
the suggested test developed in this article.
3. The Arguments for a Cross-Border Focus
The difficulties of coming up with an appropriate definition might raise the
question why one should seek to distinguish between rules for domestic and
cross-border transactions respectively. Leaving aside a possible argument based
on the constitutional framework of the EU treaties,25 there are a number of
practical arguments that lend strong support to a focus for CESL on cross-border
transactions.
The first is borne out of a criticism of the process that resulted in the
proposal for CESL in October 2011. As anyone familiar with the background to
CESL knows, the proposal has its origins in the work on a Draft Common Frame
of Reference,26 which was a huge project trying to provide a restatement of much
of private law across Europe and form a blueprint for a potential EU level
codification of private law. Following the creation of an Expert Group27 and a
Green Paper,28 this became the much more modest proposal for CESL. But this
does not change the fact that the origins of CESL are, essentially, found in the
comparative law scholarship, which produce the DCFR – in other words, the
substance of CESL is largely derived from this comparative law exercise and the
underlying desire to produce a coherent set of rules. For most legal scholars, this
is an entirely laudable exercise, but it does have one fundamental drawback – it
does not necessarily mean that the rules provided in this way are fit for dealing
with the specific problems that one might encounter in cross-border sales,
particularly those conducted online. To give but one example: it is not uncommon
25 I.e., issues of competence, subsidiarity and proportionality – on this, see, e.g., C. TWIGG-FLESNER,
A Cross-Border-Only Regulation for Consumer Transactions – A Fresh Approach to EU Consumer
Law (New York: Springer, 2012), pp 37–44.
26 Study Group on a European Civil Code/Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (Acquis
Group) (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules on European Private Law – Draft Common
Frame of Reference, (Munich: Sellier, 2009).
27 Commission Decision setting up the Expert Group on a Common Frame of Reference in the area
of European Contract Law (2010) O.J. L105/109. Cf. K. RIESENHUBER, ‘A Competitive Approach
to EU Contract Law’, 7. European Review of Contract Law 2011, 115–133 for a critical view of
this group.
28 Green Paper on Policy Options for Progress towards a European Contract Law for Consumers
and Businesses COM (2010) 348 final.
243
that a website might contain a pricing error and what would normally be rather
expensive goods are advertise for sale at a very low price.29 CESL does deal with
this issue, but it does require a bit of a ‘legal jigsaw’ to find the relevant
provisions and work out what the likely outcome would be.30
Instead, it would have been much more preferable if the starting point for
CESL had been an identification of the problems that consumers encounter in
cross-border transactions and to ensure that appropriate and clear rules were
designed to address these. In more general terms, limiting CESL to cross-border
transactions could have made it possible to develop a tailor-made framework that
would recognize that domestic and cross-border transactions do not give rise to
the same problems, as well as problems that require a different solution in the
cross-border context.31 For example, one commentator has observed that having
the same remedies for faulty goods found in domestic law for cross-border
transactions might not be appropriate and that an altogether different solution
might be needed:
My own problem here is that I am becoming increasingly doubtful whether
either termination (with an obligation to return the goods) or repair or
replacement are suitable remedies at all for cross-border consumer contracts.
Maybe we need to start from scratch and ask what people on both sides actually
want, and would actually find efficient and workable, bearing in mind that we
should soon have good mechanisms for online or alternative dispute
resolution.32
Moreover, in the cross-border context, introducing a system of direct
producer liability for faulty goods, combined with a system of ‘network liability’33
involving traders selling branded goods in co-operation with the manufacturer/
brand owner might provide a better solution than limiting the consumer’s right of
action to a claim against the immediate contracting partner.
29 Cf. Chwee Kin Keong v. Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2005] 1 SLR 502 (Court of Appeal,
Singapore), where laser printers that would normally retail at S$3,800 were advertised on the
website for S$66.
30 LAW COMMISSION, An Optional Common European Sales Law: Advantages and Problems –
Advice to the UK Government, (London, Law Commission, November 2011).
31 Cf. R. GOODE, ‘Rule, Practice and Pragmatism in Transnational Commercial Law’, 54.
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 2005, p (539) 554 ff.
32 UNNAMED, ‘Public Hearing on Common European Sales Law’ (20 Mar. 2013), online at http://
www.epln.law.ed.ac.uk/2013/03/20/public-hearing-on-common-european-sales-law/ [last accessed
28 Oct. 2014].
33 See R. BRADGATE & C. TWIGG-FLESNER, ‘Expanding the Boundaries of Liability for Quality
Defects’, 25. Journal of Consumer Policy 2002, pp 345–377.
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Limiting CESL to a specific context would therefore be a great opportunity
for re-thinking what sort of rules would be appropriate to support cross-border
transactions and move away from the underlying assumption that, as long as there
is one set of legal rules, consumers and traders would be sufficiently confident to
take up the opportunities offered by the single market. Indeed, this ‘consumer
confidence’ argument can be turned on its head: surely consumers (and traders)
would be more confident if they knew that there were dedicated rules dealing with
the various issues that arise in the cross-border context, which were clear and
easy to apply, rather than merely a single set of (often complex) rules that have a
high degree of internal consistency appealing to legal scholars but are difficult to
apply in practice and without legal assistance. Space precludes a more detailed
consideration of this issue, but the foregoing is sufficient to make the main point
that CESL needs to be designed for its particular purpose.
A concurrent benefit is that limiting CESL to cross-border transactions
leaves some room to individual Member States to respond to particular local
challenges for consumer protection, at least to the extent that this is compatible
with existing harmonizing directives and the EU treaties. It is inevitable that, in a
union of twenty-eight countries, there will be issues affecting a particular country
or region, which might necessitate a response at the local level.
Finally, one should not ignore a potentially much wider benefit of a strong
CESL, which is tailor-made for cross-border consumer transactions: although
CESL’s geographical reach will be EU Member States, it is already the case that
consumers might wish to buy goods/digital content from outside the EU’s
borders. Indeed, cross-border purchasing is something that will now happen in a
lot of countries around the world, and so CESL could not only promote the
operation of the EU’s internal market but also create a blueprint for a possible
global legal framework to support cross-border consumer transactions.
4. Challenges Associated with a Cross-Border Focus
Although there are clear advantages for pursuing the idea of a cross-border-only
CESL, there are also challenges that would, as a minimum, be acknowledged, but
in some instances require appropriate steps to be taken to manage them. In
limiting the focus of CESL to cross-border transactions, there will obviously have
to be a dividing line between cross-border and domestic transactions. As the
discussion above has demonstrated, this is far from an easy task, and it will
require careful elaboration. That said, there is a danger that situations falling into
the ‘grey area’ between domestic and cross-border transactions end up dominating
this debate when, in reality, the vast majority of transactions would clearly be
either cross-border or domestic transactions. Nevertheless, a definition that is as
clear as possible and therefore minimizes the number of situations falling into this
grey area is essential. Of course, whichever definition is chosen will involve
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consideration of the location of both parties (e.g., place of business or habitual
residence, or some other factor), which is made more difficult in the online
environment (de-localization).
In the UN Convention on Use of Electronic Communications in
International Contracts 2005, this problem is covered in Article 6(1), which states
that a person’s place of business is the location indicated by that person (and, in
the case of a natural person, its habitual residence34). The location of the
technical equipment used by a party is not determinative35 nor is the fact that the
domain name or e-mail address used is linked to a particular country.36 If this
approach were followed, there would be the practical question of how the
consumer’s habitual residence could be identified by the trader. For example, a
consumer might be required to indicate his country of residence when accessing a
website. Alternatively, when the consumer provides his personal details before
submitting his order, he could be required to confirm his country of habitual
residence (particularly if this is neither the country where the billing or the
delivery address is located). Traders will have a registered business address, which
will be relevant, and traders are already required to disclose this under various
provisions of EU law.37 So overall, this also would not appear to be a significant
obstacle.
Secondly, the consequence of limiting CESL to a cross-border-only focus is
that there will be at least two separate legal regimes for consumer transactions
and that brings with it obvious concerns over fragmentation (with different rules
applicable to domestic and cross-border situations respectively). Taken in the
abstract, this could potentially be quite a serious obstacle and one that might even
be fatal to the idea of a CESL applicable to cross-border transactions only.
However, the strength of this objection is lessened if the substantive rules of
CESL were designed in such a way as to provide a distinct set of rules for issues
that require different treatment in a cross-border situation than in a domestic
context but maintain parallels with domestic law where this is not necessary. As
far as the latter is concerned, there is already a good level of harmonization in
place in any event, and variations that might continue to exist are unlikely to
create such a high level of concern or confusion so as to make the existence of
two regimes unworkable.
That said, it is important to concede as a caveat that there is, as yet, a lack
of empirical research into how both consumers and traders might respond to the
34 Article 6(3).
35 Article 6(4).
36 Article 6(5).
37 Cf. Art. 6(1)(b) and (c) of the Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EU) and also Art. 7(4)(b) of
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EU).
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existence of two parallel regimes. It might be possible that two regimes are still
problematic, although one would expect that the fact that only two, rather than
potentially 28, different sets of rules could be applicable would be a positive step.
Again, it needs to be emphasized that this optimism is based on the argument
made above that a cross-border CESL should be designed in such a way as to
reflect the distinct requirements of these two different contexts. If that were done,
then surely the variation between these two is not a problem as long as consumers
can be told clearly when the different rules apply and what main legal implications
of either type of contracting situation would be.
So overall, whilst there might be challenges that would need to be
identified and addressed carefully, there are no insurmountable obstacles in the
way of a twin-track approach. Of course, there will always be situations where it is
not quite as easy to apply this distinction neatly, and some provision might have
to be made for these difficult cases – but to reject the idea of a measure that has
only cross-border application because of this would be an unfortunate incidence of
letting the tail wag the dog.
5. Against Optionality
Although the focus of this article is primarily on the cross-border scope of
application of CESL, there is a further feature of CESL that seems to complicate
matters rather than simplify the legal framework for cross-border consumer
transactions: the element of optionality. It might be that optionality is important
for non-consumer transactions, where the ability to choose a particular domestic
law over something like CESL and the potential implications for the performance
of that contract (including remedies, etc.) is a factor in assessing the overall
financial risk and consequently the value of the deal. However, this is unlikely to
be an issue for consumer transactions.
Moreover, the optionality ostensibly created with CESL is really only
apparent rather than real anyway – in practice, the choice as to whether to
conclude a contract on the basis of CESL would, if at all, be for the trader rather
than the consumer. As proposed, CESL contains a complex provision with the
objective of ensuring a consumer is able to make an informed choice about
whether to agree to the CESL (see Article 8). Assuming a trader is prepared to
conclude a contract on the basis of CESL, then the consumer would have to
consent explicitly to this. Giving his consent would have to be a separate step
from the consumer’s decision to conclude the contract. In order to help a
consumer to give his consent, a Standard Information Notice is provided in Annex
II of the proposed Regulation, and this has to be given to a consumer before a
contract on the basis of the CESL is concluded. This process seems so
long-winded and artificial that it may be doubted whether this would mean that
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consumers are able to make a fully informed decision – rather, it would seem to
be putting another hurdle in the way of concluding the contract itself.38
Consequently, the decision the trader will make is not really whether or not
to contract under CESL, but rather whether to deal with consumers from outside
the trader’s jurisdiction. Once that decision has been made, it seems very likely
that the trader would only offer the CESL so as to avoid bringing Article 6 of the
Rome-I Regulation into play. That being the case, it would seem much better to
accept this and to make CESL automatically applicable for cross-border
transactions.
6. Concluding Observations
This article has argued in favour of a CESL that is limited to cross-border
consumer contracts, with a definition of ‘cross-border’ that is essentially limited
to cross-border distance sales, with some modification to allow for circumstances
when a trader has actively attracted consumers from another jurisdiction to
consider concluding a contract with him. As Hugh Beale has observed, there are
good reasons for supporting cross-border trade, because if more traders sell across
borders as a result of CESL, then the resulting increase in choice and competition
would be good for consumers and might lead to reduction in prices.39
Although it looks as if the version of CESL currently proceeding through
the EU’s legislative stages will have a scope of application that focuses on the
dominant types of cross-border contracts, there are still significant problems that
would necessitate further work. That work could well mean undoing a significant
amount of what has already done: if it is accepted that CESL should be an
instrument that is ‘purpose-built’ for cross-border consumer transactions, then
that would entail that its substantive rules need to reflect the issues that arise in
that context. That, in turn, will mean re-evaluating many of the substantive
provisions in the CESL and considering which can be retained and which require
modification or replacement. Some might object that this would not only undo all
the work that has already been undertaken to get to this stage but also risk
creating legislation that is less coherent. However, ultimately, the reason for
having a cross-border CESL should be to put into place a set of legal rules that
will genuinely facilitate consumer utilization of the opportunities created by the
internal market, and in this regard, it is not enough just to have a coherent set of
38 See also M. HESSELINK, ‘How to Opt into the Common European Sales Law? Brief Comments on
the Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation’, 20. European Review of Private Law 2012, pp
195–212.
39 H. BEALE, ‘A Common European Sales Law (CESL) for Business-To-Business Contracts: Pros and
Cons’ (online: http://www.ajk.elte.hu/file/annales_2012_08_Hugh.pdf) [last accessed: 28 Oct.
2014].
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harmonized/uniform rules in place – these rules must meet the additional
qualitative requirement of being suitable for cross-border transactions.
Overall, therefore, focusing on the cross-border context is to be welcomed –
although CESL as considered by the EU’s legislative bodies thus far might not
provide the substantive rules that are really needed.
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